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To analyze the optimal social insurance package, we set up a two-period life-cycle model with 
risky human capital investment in which the government has access to labor taxation, 
education subsidies and capital taxation. Social insurance is provided by redistributive labor 
taxation. Moreover, both education subsidies and capital taxation are used as catalysts to 
facilitate social insurance by mitigating distortions from labor taxation. We derive a Ramsey-
rule for the optimal combination of these two instruments. Relative to capital taxation, 
optimal education subsidies increase with their relative effectiveness to boost labor supply 
and with households’ underinvestment into education, but they decrease with their relative net 
distortions. For the optimal absolute levels, indirect complementarity effects (i.e., influencing 
the effectiveness of the other instrument) do matter. Generally, a decrease in capital taxes 
should be accompanied by an increase in education subsidies. 
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1 Introduction
In all developed countries, the labor income tax plays an important role as a revenue
generator for ¯nancing public sector expenditures and as a means of income redistribution.
As private insurance markets are incomplete (Sinn, 1996), labor taxation is furthermore
crucial in providing social insurance against income risks due to uncertain outcomes in
education and (productivity) shocks in labor markets (Eaton and Rosen, 1980). Since
globalization has ampli¯ed income risks in recent years, the importance of the latter role
has signi¯cantly increased. Moreover, since the mid 1980s globalization has driven down
both corporate and personal capital taxes by intensifying tax competition and increasing
the elasticity of real savings (see, e.g., Winner, 2005). Furthermore, there is (anecdotal)
evidence at least in Europe that education subsidies have decreased as well (i.e., tuition
fees have risen). However, both (real) capital taxation and education subsidies are still
additional policies for social insurance.
This paper focuses on the insurance role of labor taxation and on the net e±ciency
costs unavoidably created in the process of providing insurance. We derive the optimal
social insurance package as a combination of labor and capital taxation as well as edu-
cational policy. The new focus will be on optimally combining the additional policies in
order to foster insurance provision by boosting labor supply (overcoming the \idleness",
in Franklin's words). Analogous to catalysts in chemical reactions, capital taxation and
education subsidies facilitate provision of social insurance by reducing e±ciency costs,
but they do not themselves provide insurance. Our ¯ndings are highly policy-relevant,
since we show that capital taxation and education subsidies are strategic substitutes. In
light of ongoing tax competition, this result calls into question the policy development
described above and the recent restrictive education policies in particular.
A major part of risk in labor income is associated with educational investment, which
can either mitigate or aggravate the exposure to income risk.1 However, educational
investment is a dynamic process and interacts with savings in real capital. Thus, it is
naturally necessary to bring both decision margins into the picture. Since they are close
substitutes (e.g., Nielsen and S¿rensen, 1997), any policy which fosters (hampers) human
capital investment will obviously harm (promote) real savings and vice versa. Thus,
in addition to providing su±cient social insurance, setting up an education policy and
1Empirical evidence that human capital investment cuts both ways with respect to exposure to risk is
provided, e.g., by Palacios-Huerta (2003), Belzil and Hansen (2004), and Hartog (2005). The theoretical
analysis dates back to Levhari and Weiss (1974).
2incorporating the treatment of savings in real capital are some of the most important
tasks in the e±cient design of a modern welfare state.
The idea of viewing supplementary instruments as catalysts of social insurance via
the labor income tax is { especially with respect to real capital taxation { a recent
development. In the absence of endogenous human capital investment, both Kocherlakota
(2005) and Jacobs and Schindler (2009) have analyzed this topic. The latter focus on
linear tax instruments, pointing out that capital taxation mitigates labor tax distortions
by intertemporal wealth and substitution e®ects that increase the opportunity costs of
leisure. Following the `new dynamic public ¯nance' approach (see also Golosov et al.,
2006), Kocherlakota shows in a non-linear taxation setting that there is a role for capital
taxation, since capital taxes relax the incentive constraints. Incorporating (unobservable)
human capital formation, Hamilton (1987) states that positive capital taxation should
overcome underinvestment in education due to uninsurable risk and self-insurance, by
decreasing the intertemporal opportunity costs of educational investment, if (i) labor
supply is exogenous and (ii) either savings are zero or absolute risk aversion is constant.
His results are backed by Grochulski and Piskorski (2010), who apply non-linear tax
instruments.
Turning to observable educational investment, Anderberg and Andersson (2003) state
that education should be overprovided (underprovided) if it is a risk-decreasing (risk-
increasing) activity. In doing so, educational policy exploits the insurance e®ect of human
capital and it complements social insurance by income taxation. In their approach, the
government directly controls educational investment. Jacobs et al. (2010) make clear that
the results from this paper cannot be transferred to a decentralized setting. Individuals
already exploit the insurance e®ect of education by self-insurance. Education subsidies
are still used for mitigating labor supply distortions by increasing the e®ective wage
rate, but they do not provide insurance. Furthermore, the optimal level of education
subsidies crucially depends on the internalization of a ¯scal externality that stems from
the interplay of labor taxation and over- or underinvestment in education.
To the best of our knowledge, only da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg (2009)
have analyzed the simultaneous use of education subsidies and capital taxation. They
apply a non-linear taxation setting and ¯nd a positive intertemporal wedge, indicating
a role for capital taxation. However, their results di®er as to whether the constrained
optimal level of educational investment is socially e±cient. Moreover, it is generally
di±cult or even impossible to implement these optimal wedges through tax instruments.
In contrast to these previous contributions, we derive the optimal capital taxation and
optimal education subsidies simultaneously and highlight the interactions between these
two catalysts. To that end, we apply a comprehensive two-period life-cycle model in which
ex-ante homogenous households invest in education, decide on savings, and choose labor
supply. In the second period, income realizes according to a general earnings function
3that depends on educational investment, labor supply, and an idiosyncratic shock. The
exposure to risk can increase or decrease with human capital investment. In any case,
second-period consumption is stochastic, and households are heterogenous ex-post. In
line with the literature, we assume that insurance markets are missing. Nevertheless, the
government can provide social insurance through redistributive income taxation. The
policy package consists of a linear income tax accompanied by a lump-sum transfer, a
proportional capital tax, and linear education subsidies.
Our analysis leads to a number of new insights. Firstly, education subsidies and cap-
ital taxes di®er both in the ways they boost labor supply and in the distortions they
induce. Simple intuition that only capital taxes should be used (because they are more
e®ective in boosting labor supply) is as misleading as the opposite case of saying that
only education subsidies would be the method of choice, since they are less distortive. We
derive the explicit formula for the optimal education subsidy rate and the optimal cap-
ital tax rate, showing the trade-o®s between their net complementarity e®ects on labor
supply and their net distortions of educational investment and real savings, respectively.
Thereby, (net) complementarity e®ects measure the increase in labor supply stemming
from fostering human capital and discouraging savings in real capital, respectively. More-
over, we identify \indirect complementarity e®ects", which re°ect o®setting interactions
between the two catalysts. In particular, the more education subsidies (capital taxation)
worsen the e±ciency gain of the other instrument, the less they should be employed.
Secondly, by extending the model used by Hamilton (1987), we show that there is
no longer a role for capital taxation in internalizing the (¯scal) e®ect of self-insurance
by under- or overinvesting in education. Consequently, the additive property (Sandmo,
1975) holds, and solely education subsidies are used to correct for ine±cient educational
investment, because they are the more e±cient instrument to control for education level.
The Hamilton-intuition carries over only in the special case in which education subsidies
are not available. By incorporating endogenous labor supply and a general earnings
function, we point out in this case that the Hamilton-result holds under much weaker
conditions and capital taxes are also used to boost labor supply. Furthermore, the optimal
capital tax rate can become negative if there is severe overinvestment in education. In
this case, discouraging excessive educational investment by a subsidy on capital income
overcompensates its negative e®ects on labor supply.
Thirdly, we derive a Ramsey-type rule, which provides the optimal education subsidies
relative to the optimal use of capital taxation. It shows that capital taxes and education
subsidies are (strategic) substitutes. Thus, decreases in capital taxes (e.g., due to tax
competition or globalization) should be accompanied by increases in education subsidies.
This result is highly policy-relevant and should be kept in mind when discussing education
policy reforms.
Fourthly, our analysis adds to the `new dynamic public ¯nance' literature (e.g., An-
4derberg, 2009). We show that the main results and the basic intuition in this strand of
the literature are still valid under linear tax instruments and informationally much less
demanding requirements. The advantage of our setting is that the tax structure can be
directly implemented and that the driving forces behind the optimal instruments as well
as their interactions can be explicitly characterized.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the model
and sets up the optimal tax problem. Section 3 then derives the optimal social insurance
package. As a benchmark case, we discuss ¯rst the optimal labor tax rate, if there are
no other policies available. Then, we describe the optimal use of education subsidies
and capital taxation as catalysts; ¯nally, we analyze the optimal labor tax when both
education subsidies and capital taxation are optimally chosen. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Technologies and Preferences
We analyze a two-period model in which a continuum of ex-ante identical households
decide on their educational investment, consumption, and second-period labor supply.
We assume that individuals are endowed with an initial wealth ! and with one unit
of time in each period. We assume further that education e is a pure time investment
and that there is no labor-leisure decision in the ¯rst period. Educational investment
is observable and veri¯able. Hence, educational costs (i.e., the forgone earnings) can be
deducted against the income tax base and can be additionally taxed or subsidized by
educational policy.2 Aside from investing in education, households can save or borrow in
a perfect capital market. Savings are denoted by a. The ¯rst-period budget constraint
(before taxation and education subsidies) reads
a = ! + (1 ¡ e) ¡ c1; (1)
where c1 is consumption in the ¯rst period, and where the ¯rst-period wage rate as well
as the price of consumption has been normalized to one.
In the second period, households supply labor l and consume their savings plus labor
income. Gross labor income is represented by a general earnings function dependent on
hours worked l and education e:
©(µ;l;e); ©e; ©l > 0; ©ee < 0; ©ll · 0: (2)
µ is an idiosyncratic shock drawn from a probability distribution f(µ). Therefore, both
2We could also allow for direct resource costs of education without any loss of generality. As long as
all inputs are veri¯able, this does not change the results (see also Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2003, 2005).
5income and the return to education are risky. We assume that for any given value of µ, the
marginal return to education ©e is positive and decreasing. Similarly, the marginal return
to labor e®ort ©l is positive and non-increasing. Furthermore, the random variable µ is
assumed to have a positive e®ect on income: ©µ > 0. In the remainder of the analysis,
we focus on the two cases identi¯ed in the literature (cf. Levhari and Weiss, 1974):
(i) educational investment itself causes and ampli¯es income risks (©µe > 0), and (ii)
educational investment hedges against income risks (©µe < 0). The budget constraint in
the second period (before taxation) is
c2 = ©(µ;l;e) + (1 + r) ¢ a; (3)
where c2 is consumption in the second period and r is the constant real interest rate.
Households derive utility from consumption and disutility from labor. They maximize
a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function. Following common practice in the
optimal tax literature under risk, we assume the utility function to be additively separable
over consumption and labor supply (see, e.g., Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a, 1995b; Golosov
et al., 2006; Diamond, 2006):3
EU = E[U(c1;c2;l)] = E[u(c1;c2)] ¡ v(l); u1;u2;¡vl > 0; u11;u22;¡vll · 0; (4)
where E denotes the expectation operator (i.e., E[X] ´
R
£ Xdf(µ), where £ is the set of
values for µ). The sub-utility function of consumption is increasing and concave, whereas
the disutility function of labor supply is increasing and convex. All functions are at least
twice di®erentiable, and we assume the Inada conditions to hold.
Insurance markets to insure (idiosyncratic) income risks are imperfect; for simplicity,
we assume that they are missing.4 Market failure is due to moral hazard, adverse selection,
and, as Sinn (1996, p. 261®) points out, timing and contract problems. Perfect insurance
contracts have to be signed before the veil of ignorance has lifted. However, this is hardly
possible with respect to human capital risks or innate abilities for example, where parents
would have to sign contracts for their children or even for their unborn children. Since
a child would have to ful¯ll these obligations incontestably for all its life, this system
would come close to bondage. Thus, Sinn (1996, p. 278) concludes that such insurance
\cannot be provided privately unless the fundamentals of western civil law are called into
question."
Instead, the government can provide social insurance by redistributive taxation. We
assume that this takes place through a linear income tax system with a marginal tax
3This assumption ful¯lls the requirements for the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem to hold. Hence, any
non-zero capital tax rate will be due to incomplete insurance markets and providing social insurance.
4Note that this assumption simpli¯es the analysis, but only a®ects the level of taxation, not the
optimal tax structure.
6rate t and a lump-sum transfer T, which can be seen as a negative income tax or basic
income. Furthermore, educational investment is subsidized at a °at rate s and it is fully
tax deductible. Last but not least, the return to savings is taxed at a °at rate ¿. Interest
expenses on borrowing are subsidized at this rate: there is full loss o®-set. Taken together,
our model is similar to the set-up in Hamilton (1987). However, education can be directly
subsidized or taxed in our approach, and we allow for a more general risk (and income)
process in which education can either enforce or hedge against income risk.
The timing structure of the model is as follows: First, the government sets the pro-
portional labor tax rate t, the subsidy rate s, the capital tax rate ¿, and the lump-sum
transfer T. After the policies are announced, households choose educational investment
e, ¯rst-period consumption c1, and labor supply l simultaneously, before risk realizes.5
Subsequently, (income) risk realizes, incomes are earned, and second-period consumption
takes place. Second-period consumption is thus stochastic, while ¯rst-period consump-
tion, working time, and education are deterministic.
2.2 Households
Due to perfect capital markets, a household faces an intertemporal budget constraint
after income tax and education subsidies
c2 = (1 ¡ t) ¢ ©(e;l;µ) + R ¢ [! + (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)e) ¡ c1] + T; (5)
where R = 1+r ¢(1¡¿) represents the net interest factor. Subject to budget constraint
(5), a household maximizes its expected utility function EU = E[u(c1;c2)] ¡ v(l) by
choosing optimal intertemporal consumption, educational investment, and second-period
labor supply. The maximization problem becomes
max
c1;l;e
E[u(c1;(1 ¡ t) ¢ ©(e;l;µ) + R ¢ [! + (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)e) ¡ c1] + T)] ¡ v(l); (6)
and the appropriate ¯rst order conditions are
E[u1] ¡ R ¢ E[u2] = 0; (7)
E[u2 ¢ f(1 ¡ t)©e(e;l;µ) ¡ R ¢ (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ s)g] = 0: (8)
E[u2 ¢ (1 ¡ t)©l(e;l;µ)] ¡ vl = 0; (9)
Equation (7) implies that for optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption, the
expected marginal rate of substitution meets the net interest factor { that is, the standard
5It can be shown that a timing sequence in which labor supply is chosen after uncertainty has been
resolved does not change any of the results qualitatively (cf. Cremer and Gavhari, 1995a; Anderberg
and Andersson, 2003).




From the ¯rst-order condition for optimal educational investment (8), it follows by
Steiner's Rule that the risk-adjusted marginal return to educational investment is equal
to the present value of marginal investment costs (after subsidization),
(1 ¡ ¼e) ¢ E[©e] = R ¢ (1 ¡ s); (11)
where ¼e = ¡
cov(u2;©e)
E[u2]E[©e] 2 (¡1;1) represents the risk premium in educational investment,
measuring disutility from increased exposure to risk. ¼e is positive if education is risk-
increasing, i.e., if ©µe > 0. For instance, this holds for sector-speci¯c human capital
investment. It is negative if education serves as a hedge and provides insurance against
income risks (e.g., general upper-secondary education). This is true if ©µe < 0.
As we have assumed educational investment to be observable and tax deductible, the
tax system does not directly a®ect investment in education. However, taxation generally
a®ects investment in education indirectly via the labor supply: a tax-induced decrease in
labor supply lowers the return to human capital investment as long as ©el > 0. This is
the case for all earnings functions discussed in the literature (cf. Jacobs and Bovenberg,
2010a). As a result, taxation reduces the incentives for investing in education. Instead,
education subsidies boost educational investment, since they reduce the marginal costs.
Missing insurance markets, however, drive a wedge between the expected marginal
return to education and the net investment costs, implying
E[©e] ¡ R ¢ (1 ¡ s) = ¼e ¢ E[©e] =
¼e
1 ¡ ¼e
¢ R ¢ (1 ¡ s) ? 0 if ¼e ? 0: (12)
Facing uninsurable income risk, households use educational investment as a self-insurance
device to reduce their exposure to risk. If education is risk-increasing (risk-decreasing),
households invest too little (much) in education from a social point of view: the expected
marginal return is higher (lower) than the marginal costs. This investment behavior is
individually rational, but socially ine±cient. The ine±ciency will become worse the more
risk-averse households are (i.e., the higher the risk premium in absolute terms would be).
Accordingly, the ¯rst-order condition for labor supply (9) can be rearranged as




where ¼l = ¡
cov(u2;©l)
E[u2]E[©l] mirrors the risk premium in labor supply. Hence, for optimal labor
supply, the risk-adjusted net wage rate equals the marginal rate of substitution between
8consumption and labor. The presence of risk acts as an additional tax on labor, if labor
supply is a risk-increasing activity (¼l > 0), but it turns into a wage subsidy, in the case
that higher labor supply reduces the exposure to income risk (¼l < 0).
Substituting optimal consumption, educational investment, and labor supply in the
expected utility function, the expected indirect utility function becomes
V (T;t;s;R) = E[u(^ c1;^ c2)] ¡ v(^ l); (14)
where a hat indicates the optimal values.
For later reference, we apply the Envelope theorem (Roy's lemma) to ¯nd the deriva-
tives of the indirect utility function as @V
@T = E[u2], @V
@t = ¡E[u2¢f©(e;l;µ) + R ¢ (1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)e)g],
@V
@s = E[u2] ¢ R ¢ (1 ¡ t) ¢ e, and @V
@R = E[u2] ¢ [! + (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ s) ¢ e) ¡ c1].
2.3 Government
We assume a benevolent government with full (and credible) commitment. Thus, a time-
inconsistency motive cannot appear. Without loss of generality, we abstract from an
exogenous government revenue requirement. The government chooses policy instruments
T, t, s, and R to maximize the expected indirect utility V (T;t;s;R) of the households.
The informational requirements for employing linear instruments are that only aggregate
income, aggregate savings, and aggregate education choices need to be veri¯able to the
government. Then, taxes can be collected and subsidies can be paid in a withholding
fashion at ¯rm level and individual incomes need not be observed.
By the law of large numbers, individual idiosyncratic risks cancel in the aggregate,
and we ¯nd that the government budget constraint is given by
t¢[E[©(e;l;µ)] + (1 + r) ¢ (1 ¡ (1 ¡ s) ¢ e)]+(1+r¡R)¢[!+(1¡t)(1¡(1¡s)¢e)¡c1]¡(1+r)¢s¢e = T
(15)
All tax revenue is deterministic at the aggregate level and it is used to ¯nance the
lump-sum transfer and education subsidies. We abstract from any systematic risk.6
Taken together, the optimization problem can be displayed as:
max
T;t;s;R
V (T;t;s;R) s.t. (15) (16)
6In the case of additional systematic (aggregate) income risks, the government's tax revenue would
also become risky. This would require an additional insurance device in the form of public consumption
to smooth aggregate shocks over private and public consumption (see, e.g., Kaplow, 1994), but it should
not a®ect our main ¯ndings on insuring the idiosyncratic part of risk.


































































where we have de¯ned the (expected) tax wedges as




¢ R ¢ (1 ¡ s) ¡ R ¢ s ¡ ¿r; (21)
¢l = t ¢ E[©l]; (22)
¢c1 = ¡¿r: (23)
The tax wedges indicate the (expected) change in total tax revenue, based on the be-
havioral responses of households due to a marginal change in one of the tax instruments.
Thereby, the second equality in equation (21) stems from applying the households' ¯rst-
order condition (8) twice.
2.4 Decision Margins and Distortions
The task of the government is to provide social insurance { that is, to redistribute between
\winners" and \losers". Income risk can be reduced by implementing a wage tax and
granting a deterministic lump-sum transfer. However, this comes at the cost of distorting
labor supply and creating a ¯scal externality. The latter stems from the fact that the
marginal return and the marginal costs of educational investment are not equalized, due
to self-insurance of households by under- or overinvesting in education. Consequently, a
marginal increase in education creates a positive (negative) tax-revenue e®ect in the case
of underinvestment (overinvestment) in education (see Jacobs et al., 2010).
In order to alleviate these e±ciency costs, both education subsidies and capital taxa-
tion can be applied as `catalysts' for social insurance via labor taxation. Education sub-
sidies increase human capital investment and, thus, the e®ective wage rate. As a result,
education subsidies alleviate labor tax distortions by increasing labor supply. However,
this is paid for by distorting educational investment.
Capital taxation fosters labor supply via two channels: ¯rst, it functions as an indi-
10rect education subsidy by reducing the opportunity costs of human capital investment.
Consequently, it encourages labor supply in the second period, but it distorts educational
investment. Second, capital taxation reduces second-period consumption and boosts la-
bor supply by increasing the marginal utility of income, viz., the opportunity costs of
second-period leisure.7 However, the latter e®ect has the disadvantage of distorting in-
tertemporal consumption choice.
In the following analysis, we examine how these three instruments can be optimally
combined in order to balance the net distortions on all margins and to provide the optimal
social insurance package. The main question to be answered is how education subsidies
and capital taxation can serve as catalysts to facilitate income insurance.
3 The Social Insurance Package
3.1 Optimal Transfer Income
Following Diamond (1975), we de¯ne the expected net social marginal value of income,
including the income e®ects on the tax base, as b ´
E[u2]
´ + ¢e ¢ @e
@T + ¢l ¢ @l
@T + ¢c1 ¢
@c1
@T .














Thus, the optimal lump-sum transfer balances the net marginal value of income (from
society's perspective) against its marginal revenue costs, which equal unity.
3.2 Labor Taxation Without Catalysts
First, we derive as a benchmark case the optimal labor tax rate t without catalysts {
namely, the government can use neither education subsidies nor capital taxation. This
case arises when neither educational investment nor savings are veri¯able by the govern-
ment. This corresponds to the set of instruments in Eaton and Rosen (1980).






as the negatively normalized covariance between the marginal utility of income and in-
come. The insurance characteristic » gives the marginal welfare loss of income risk and
measures the government's concern for insurance.
Moreover, we de¯ne the expected-utility compensated elasticities with respect to the
labor tax rate as "et = @ec
@t
1¡t
e and "lt = @lc
@t
1¡t
l . By applying the Slutsky equations and
7See Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) or Jacobs and Schindler (2009) for a detailed analysis of this e®ect.
11equation (24) to eliminate income e®ects, and by inserting s = ¿ = 0, the optimal labor









E[©] and !e =
E[©ee]
E[©] are the expected earnings shares of labor and educa-
tion in total earnings, respectively.
Equation (26) represents the standard trade-o® between the welfare gain of provid-
ing insurance and the e±ciency costs of doing so. The higher the bene¯ts from social
insurance (i.e., the higher » > 0 is), the higher the optimal tax rate should be, ceteris
paribus. However, providing social insurance creates excess burden, in particular from
distorting labor supply. We assume { for all the following elasticities as well { that all
compensated elasticities maintain their signs under certainty; hence "lt < 0.8 All things
equal, the larger (¡"lt) > 0 is, the more labor taxation distorts labor supply and the
lower the optimal tax rate should be.
Furthermore, the optimal labor tax rate depends on a ¯scal externality (¼e ¢ !e ¢ "et),
which can be of any sign.9 Note that the labor tax elasticity of educational investment
is negative, "et < 0, because an increase in labor taxation decreases (compensated) labor
supply and therefore the utilization of human capital. In the case of ¼e > 0 (¼e < 0),
where there is under- (over-)investment in education, a marginal decrease in educational
investment decreases (increases) tax revenue. Therefore, increasing the labor tax rate
causes a negative (positive) ¯scal externality, calling for a lower (higher) labor tax rate.
3.3 Education Subsidies and Capital Taxation as Catalysts
In the case in which both educational investment and savings in real capital are observable
and veri¯able, the government can use both instruments as catalysts for social insurance
policy. We de¯ne the expected-utility compensated elasticities with respect to the subsidy
rate as "es = @ec
@s
1¡s
e , "ls = @lc
@s
1¡s





c1 . Furthermore, the corresponding













The optimal education subsidies follow from combining the ¯rst-order conditions (19)





"ls ¡ "as ¢
"lR
"aR












¢ ^ t: (27)
8Though in principle the signs of some of these elasticities are ambiguous due to o®setting insurance
e®ects, this assumption should hold under mild restrictions; see Jacobs and Schindler (2009) for a com-
prehensive discussion in a related setting as well as Jacobs and Bovenberg (2010b) for signing elasticities
in a deterministic model.
9See Jacobs et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion of the ¯scal externality.






(¡"lR) + "eR ¢
"ls
"es
"aR ¡ "eR ¢ "as
"es
#
!l ¢ ^ t: (28)
We de¯ne °e = R¢e
E[©] and °c1 =
R¢c1
E[©] as shares of expenditure on education and ¯rst-period
consumption in total earnings, respectively. Moreover, we de¯ne the savings elasticity
with respect to education subsidies as "as = ¡(°e ¢ "es + °c1 ¢ "c1s) < 0, which com-
bines the expenditure-share weighted e®ects of education subsidies on educational in-
vestment and on ¯rst-period consumption. We assume that education subsidies increase
¯rst-period consumption ("c1s > 0). The reasoning is as follows: education subsidies
increase total income by encouraging education and increasing the labor supply. The
resulting higher labor income increases consumption in both periods from consumption-
smoothing. The savings elasticity with respect to the net interest rate is de¯ned as
"aR = ¡(°e ¢ "eR + °c1 ¢ "c1R) > 0. It is unambiguously positive, because a higher net
interest rate R renders both educational investment and ¯rst-period consumption less
attractive.
The insurance characteristic » does not enter into either of the two optimal tax rules,
and both expressions hold for the optimal labor tax rate ^ t as well as for an arbitrarily
given tax rate t > 0. Accordingly, two straightforward results apply both to the optimal
education subsidies and to the optimal capital taxation. First, neither catalyst directly
provides social insurance, since both capital tax payments and education subsidies re-
ceived do not a®ect the variance of income; that is, they do not vary across the states
of nature. Moreover, all households are homogenous ex ante; consequently, there is no
ability bias at work, either (see Maldonado, 2008, and Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2010a,
for ability bias in a deterministic world with heterogenous households). Second, neither
instrument is used if there is no social insurance. If the labor tax rate were zero, t = 0,
the only insurance device available would be self-insurance by over- or underinvestment
in education, which is optimally chosen by households. This insurance e®ect would be
disturbed by subsidizing education or taxing capital income. Furthermore, in the case
where t = 0, there would be no ¯scal externality to be corrected for.
From equation (27) we ¯nd that, ¯rstly, optimal education subsidies decrease with
distortions caused, which are represented by the denominator in the ¯rst term on the
right-hand side. The more elastic educational investment is with respect to subsidies
("es > 0), the higher the excess burden of this instrument will be. However, the availabil-
ity of capital taxation allows for a mitigating complementarity e®ect: reducing distortions
in educational investment can be traded against distorting real savings,
"eR
"aR < 0, and this
e®ect becomes stronger the more the savings tax base responds to education subsidies,
13"as < 0. Secondly, education subsidies increase with the marginal e±ciency gains from
boosting labor supply, as indicated by "ls > 0 in the numerator of the ¯rst term on the
right-hand side. Due to the complementarity between labor supply and education, edu-
cation subsidies foster labor supply and counteract the negative incentive e®ects of labor
taxation (Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005; Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2010a). Thirdly, education
subsidies interfere with the complementarity e®ect of capital taxation on labor supply.
Capital taxation also alleviates distortions in labor supply, both by fostering education
(Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2010b) and through intertemporal consumption e®ects (Jacobs
and Schindler, 2009), but this e±ciency gain has to be traded o® against (downward)
distortions in savings (see
"lR
"aR < 0). Since education subsidies distort real savings down-
wards as well, they worsen the aforementioned trade-o®: applying capital taxes becomes
more costly. Hence, education subsidies make the capital tax a less e®ective instrument
to boost labor supply. The stronger this interference ("as¢
"lR
"aR > 0) is, the lower education
subsidies should be. They might (ceteris paribus) even turn negative in order to boost
the capital-tax e®ect. In the following discussion, we will call this interference e®ect the
\indirect complementarity e®ect".
Fourthly, we see from equations (27) and (28) that the additive property of internal-
izing externalities in an optimal-tax setting (Sandmo, 1975) holds, if su±cient instru-
ments are available. In contrast to mitigating labor supply distortions, the externality
is corrected by relying on education subsidies only, and in an additive manner. This is
represented by ¼e
1¡¼e, the second summand on the right-hand side of (27). Depending on
the sign and the magnitude of the externality, education subsidies can also turn negative.
The risk premium ¼e does not explicitly enter into the formula for the optimal capital tax
rate. Accordingly, when education subsidies are optimally chosen, ine±cient educational
investment does not directly a®ect capital taxation. The reason is that directly relying
on the price of the \commodity" causing the externality is more e±cient (see Sandmo,
1975, pp. 92, 95). In our case, this commodity is education and its relevant price is
directly linked with education subsidies.
Turning to the optimal capital taxation as given by equation (28), we ¯nd that, ¯rstly,
the capital tax rate decreases with distortions caused in compensated savings, "aR > 0.
The more elastic savings are with respect to the interest rate, the higher the e±ciency
losses from capital taxation are. However, education subsidies can moderate distortions in
savings, traded against distortions in educational investment ("as
"es < 0). This trade-o® is
more important, the more a higher interest rate decreases educational investment ("eR <
0). Thus, this complementarity e®ect works in favor of higher capital taxes. Secondly,
capital taxation improves e±ciency by fostering labor supply via two channels. (i) By
reducing second-period consumption, capital taxation increases the marginal utility of
income and thus the opportunity costs of leisure. Consequently, capital taxation (ceteris
paribus) boosts labor supply in the second period (cf. Jacobs and Schindler, 2009). (ii)
14Capital taxation encourages human capital investment. Therefore, it fosters labor supply
by increasing the opportunity costs of leisure on this account as well. Consequently,
capital taxation mitigates labor supply distortions. This is represented by the ¯rst term
in the numerator, (¡"lR) > 0. Thirdly, there is an \indirect complementarity e®ect" at
work. Education subsidies boost labor supply, but distort educational investment (see the
discussion of equation (27) above). This trade-o® is more bene¯cial, the higher
"ls
"es > 0
is. The more a higher interest rate decreases educational investment ("eR < 0), the more
the aforementioned trade-o® is improved and the lower the capital tax should be ceteris
paribus.
Considering the second and the third aspect together, the optimal capital tax can
also be negative, contrary to models without endogenous educational investment (Cre-
mer and Gahvari, 1995a,b; Jacobs and Schindler, 2009). Capital taxation will be equal
to zero in the special case in which its complementarity e®ect on labor supply "lR exactly





"es. In this case, both instruments are (per \unit" of distortion in
educational investment) equally e®ective in boosting labor supply, and capital taxation
becomes redundant, since it additionally distorts intertemporal consumption. Generally,
mitigation by capital taxation is less important, the more labor supply distortions are
mitigated via education subsidies.
We summarize:
Proposition 1. If both savings and educational investment are veri¯able, both capital
taxation and education subsidies are used for mitigating labor supply distortions, but they
do not provide any direct insurance. Both instruments increase with their complemen-
tarity e®ect on labor and decrease with induced net distortions and with harming the
complementarity e®ect of the other instrument. The additive property for externalities
holds and only education subsidies are used to internalize the external e®ect of missing
insurance markets.
In comparison to models relying only on education subsidies (cf. Jacobs et al., 2010),
the availability of capital taxation has signi¯cant e®ects. The intuition can be brie°y sum-
marized as follows: ¯rst, capital taxation is another way to mitigate distortions in labor
supply by indirectly subsidizing educational investment. Second, there is a stand-alone
e®ect of capital taxation on labor supply via intertemporal wealth e®ects (cf. Jacobs and
Schindler, 2009). Therefore, capital taxation has an additional complementarity e®ect
working independently of education.10 Nevertheless, both education subsidies and capital
taxation are used. Education subsidies are less distortive in the sense that they distort
only educational investment; however, they a®ect labor supply only by complementarity
10Without showing this explicitly, this intertemporal mechanism is also relevant in extensions of models
with centrally decided educational investment (e.g., Anderberg and Andersson, 2003).
15between education and labor, and they are costly in the sense that the government has
to collect tax revenue to ¯nance subsidies. On the other hand, capital taxes not only
distort educational investment, but also intertemporal consumption.
Consequently, extending and generalizing the modeling by Hamilton (1987) preserves
the use of capital taxation, but its role fundamentally changes. In particular, capital
taxation is no longer required for internalizing the ¯scal externality, but only used to
alleviate tax distortion in labor supply.
From rearranging and dividing equation (27) by equation (28), we obtain a Ramsey-
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The second term on the right-hand side of equation (29) mirrors the e®ect of the ¯scal
externality. As implied by the additive property, the relative reliance on education sub-
sidies ceteris paribus increases (decreases) with the magnitude of the ¯scal externality
¼e in the case of underinvestment ¼e > 0 (overinvestment ¼e < 0). Ceteris paribus,
the externality is more signi¯cant, the higher the net distortions of capital taxation are
("aR ¡ "eR ¢ "as
"es > 0), i.e., the more costly capital taxation is. These net distortions are
positive from the second-order conditions of the governmental optimization problem. The
externality matters less, the more relevant labor supply is (viz., the larger the share !l
is) and the better capital taxation can alleviate labor supply distortions (i.e., the higher
(¡"lR) + "eR ¢
"ls
"es is).
The ¯rst term on the right-hand side encompasses two e®ects: on the one hand, there is
the standard distortion e®ect. The more net distortions capital taxation causes in savings
relative to risk-adjusted, income-weighted net distortions in educational investment by







¢!e¢(1¡¼e) is), the more expensive capital
taxation is in terms of welfare costs. Thus, the more education subsidies will ceteris
paribus be used compared to capital taxation. Note that the \indirect complementarity
e®ects" discussed in equations (27) and (28) cancel out, but also that there are now
alleviating complementarity e®ects working via labor supply ("lR¢ "as
"ls > 0 and "ls¢
"eR
"lR > 0,
respectively). On the other hand, contrary to a standard Ramsey rule, the instruments
di®er in their bene¯cial e®ects. Thus, education subsidies are also preferable to capital




Equation (29) indicates that education subsidies and capital taxes are (strategic)
substitutes { that is, if one instrument increases, the other one should optimally decrease.
This substitutability establishes a policy-relevant link between educational policy and
competition in personal tax rates on real capital. Winner (2005) provides strong evidence
16that tax competition has been on-going since the mid-1980s by showing a shift from
taxing capital to taxing labor. This shift in tax burdens is due not only to corporate
tax competition, but also to a decrease in personal capital income taxes, as is observable
in all OECD countries. If ¯ercer `tax competition' is interpreted as globalization, which
ceteris paribus raises the elasticity of savings due to a larger mobility of capital (i.e., as
an increase in "aR), we ¯nd from equation (28) that the optimal capital tax decreases,
because it now becomes more costly. As can be seen from the Ramsey-type equation
(29), education subsidies should be increased relative to capital taxation, at least as long
as there is underinvestment, ¼e > 0.
However, the e®ect on the absolute level of optimal education subsidies implied
by equation (27) is ambiguous. On the one hand, education subsidies are less neces-
sary to reduce capital-tax induced distortions in education through decreasing savings
("as ¢
"eR
"aR > 0). This ceteris paribus decreases subsidies. On the other hand, it becomes
less important that education subsidies hamper the complementarity e®ect of capital
taxation ("as ¢
"lR
"aR > 0), since the latter is less e®ective. This ceteris paribus increases
education subsidies. As long as mitigating labor supply distortions carries more weight
than mitigating distortions in educational investment, optimal education subsidies in-
crease absolutely as well. Consequently, under these conditions, capital tax competition
should be accompanied by increasing direct subsidies on education. We conclude:
Corollary 1. Capital taxation and education subsidies tend to be (strategic) substitutes as
long as reducing labor supply distortions is important. Then, a lower capital tax rate due
to capital-tax competition should be accompanied by higher (direct) education subsidies.
3.4 Non-observable Educational Investment
Two relevant special cases can be analyzed. For the ¯rst, in which capital taxation is not
available, we refer to Jacobs et al. (2010). In this section, we analyze the opposite case,
in which the government cannot observe educational investment and education subsidies
are thus unavailable. This setting allows speci¯cation of the results in Hamilton (1987).
The optimal capital tax rate in the absence of education subsidies follows from setting












¢ ^ t: (30)
Again, equation (30) balances the marginal e±ciency gains against the marginal excess
burden of capital taxation. However, without education subsidies, capital taxation has
to correct the ¯scal externality as well. Hamilton (1987) assumes multiplicative risk,
unambiguously implying underinvestment in education. He argues that capital taxation
should be used to correct this ine±cient educational investment, and he shows that the
17optimal capital tax is positive, in the case in which (i) labor supply is inelastic and
(ii) either equilibrium savings are zero or there is constant absolute risk aversion. Our
approach shows that these very strong assumptions can be relaxed, and it extends the
Hamilton-analysis by deriving a closed-form solution for the optimal capital tax.11
Equation (30) con¯rms that capital taxation is increasing with the magnitude of the
¯scal externality in the case of underinvestment (i.e., ¼e > 0). In other words, the
more education is distorted downwards by uninsurable income risk, the stronger the
need for capital taxation in order to encourage education is. Furthermore, the more
e®ective capital taxation is in fostering education ("eR < 0), the higher its tax rate
should be. Contrary to Hamilton (1987), however, the optimal capital tax rate can also
turn negative, in the case that educational investment is a risk-reducing activity (i.e.,
if there is overinvestment and ¼e < 0) and if the ¯scal externality e®ect dominates the
complementarity e®ect in labor supply; this is described in the following paragraph. In
this case, interest income should be subsidized to discourage excessive overinvestment
into education.
As we allow for endogenous labor supply, there is a second e®ect at work. Capital
taxation boosts labor supply and moderates distortions from social insurance by foster-
ing educational investment and decreasing second-period consumption (see the previous
subsection). Accordingly, the optimal capital tax rate also increases with the comple-
mentarity between capital taxation and labor supply ("lR < 0).
All these bene¯cial e®ects are traded o® against distortions in real savings ("aR > 0).
A higher net interest rate increases the (intertemporal) opportunity costs of human capital
investment ("eR < 0), and it increases the price of ¯rst-period consumption ("c1R < 0) as
well. Consequently, savings are increased by a higher net interest rate. These distortions
decrease the optimal capital taxation.
Proposition 2. If education subsidies are not available, capital taxation is used for boost-
ing endogenous labor supply and for internalizing the ¯scal e®ect from under- or overin-
vestment in education. Depending on the risk properties of education (¼e ? 0) and the
magnitude of the ¯scal externality, the optimal capital tax rate can be negative as well.
Grochulski and Piskorski (2010) show that the unobservability of educational invest-
ment makes incentive constraints more severe and that it leads to a larger wedge on real
capital investment. The latter is implemented by a higher volatility of marginal capital
tax rates. In our linear-taxation model, the optimal capital tax rate tends also to be
higher in the absence of education subsidies, but only in case of underinvestment. This
is because capital taxation is the only instrument to alleviate labor supply distortions
and to internalize the ¯scal externality. However, if education is risk-decreasing, capital
11Note that the capital tax rate ¿ also enters into the elasticities on the right-hand side. As is usual
in public ¯nance, it still highlights in detail the trade-o®s determining the optimal tax rate.
18taxation will be decreased ceteris paribus to ¯ght against the e®ect of overinvestment in
human capital.
3.5 Optimal Labor Tax Cum Catalysts
Substituting equations (27) and (28) into equation (36) in the appendix ¯nally leads to
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The optimal labor tax rate increases with the welfare gain » from reducing income risk,
but it decreases with the tax elasticity of labor supply ("lt). The labor supply distortions
are, however, more alleviated, the more labor taxation boosts the net complementarity
e®ect of education subsidies by decreasing subsidy-induced distortions in education (i.e.,
the larger "et < 0 is in absolute value). This is called the \s-e®ect" in equation (31).
The same holds true for fostering the net complementarity e®ect of capital taxation by
reducing capital-tax-induced distortions in savings (viz., by having a larger "at > 0). The
latter is named the \¿-e®ect". These complementarity e®ects ceteris paribus increase the
labor tax rate, allowing for a better social insurance.
As demonstrated by Jacobs et al. (2010), the ¯scal externality ceases to enter into the
optimal labor tax formula. Thus, with optimal education subsidies, ine±cient educational
investment no longer directly a®ects the optimal labor taxation. In comparison to Jacobs
et al. (2010), the availability of capital taxation increases the likelihood of better social
insurance in equation (31) relative to the case without catalysts in (26).
Our analysis provides a complement to the analysis of optimal non-linear taxation in
the `new dynamic public ¯nance' literature (see Golosov et al., 2006; Diamond, 2006). If
only real savings are observable, Kocherlakota (2005) and Grochulski and Piskorski (2010)
point out that capital should bear a positive wedge for relaxing incentive constraints. In
the case of veri¯able educational investment, Anderberg (2009) and da Costa and Maestri
(2007) show that education should bear a wedge as well, i.e., that both education subsidies
and capital taxation are optimally used in order to provide social insurance e±ciently.
Our approach con¯rms their results for the informationally less demanding case of
linear tax instruments. The downside of linear taxation is that the tax structure is less
°exible; however, the upside is that the government only has to verify aggregate labor
income, aggregate savings, and aggregate investment in education. Our analysis sheds
light on the driving forces and the main intuition behind optimal positive intertemporal
19and educational wedges for relaxing incentive constraints (namely, increasing opportunity
costs of leisure). In addition, we point out that, under linear tax instruments, the optimal
capital tax rate can become negative if it severely interferes with boosting labor supply
by education subsidies. To the best of our knowledge, this result is new to the existing
literature.
Another advantage of linear instruments is that they are directly implementable. The
reason is that successful (i.e., high-ability) agents cannot pro¯t from mimicking unsuc-
cessful (i.e., low-ability) agents. We derive explicit formulas for the optimal education
subsidies and the optimal capital tax rate. In contrast, for non-linear taxation in the vein
of `new dynamic public ¯nance', implementing the optimal intertemporal wedges is di±-
cult and needs additional requirements (e.g., special assumptions about the distribution
of shocks and record-keeping as in Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006). Except for very spe-
cial cases, implementing optimal educational wedges is even impossible (see Anderberg,
2009).
4 Conclusions
This paper examined the optimal social insurance package in an intertemporal model.
While income risk is insured only by labor taxation, both education subsidies and capital
taxation, if available, serve as catalysts for social insurance through mitigating labor sup-
ply distortions. Optimal education subsidies increase with their complementarity e®ect
on labor supply via enhancing education, but they decrease with induced net distortions
in educational investment. The optimal capital tax also increases with its complementar-
ity e®ect, which boosts labor supply both by fostering education and by intertemporal
wealth e®ects. It decreases with its distortions in real savings. Both instruments decrease
with interfering with the complementarity e®ect of the other instrument. Since educa-
tion subsidies and capital taxation di®er both in their bene¯ts and in the distortions they
cause, both instruments are generally used and their net marginal dead-weight losses are
balanced against each other.
Our results show that capital taxation is optimally used under less restrictive as-
sumptions than examined in Hamilton (1987). In the case that educational investment
is not observable, capital taxation is used both for mitigating labor supply distortions
and for internalizing a ¯scal externality, which results from self-insurance of households
by over- or underinvesting in education. If educational investment is veri¯able, it follows
from our analysis that capital taxation is no longer used for internalization of the ¯scal
externality and that the additive property holds (see Sandmo, 1975). This is because
education subsidies are the preferable direct instrument. Nevertheless, capital taxation
still plays a role in such a generalized Hamilton-model: it is applied to boost the labor
supply. Furthermore, our analysis of linear taxes complements the `new dynamic public
20¯nance' literature. We derive closed-form solutions for optimal tax rates that are directly
implementable.
Our results have a clear policy implication: if tax competition decreases personal
capital tax rates, education subsidies should increase. In Europe, (personal) capital
taxes are indeed decreasing, but education subsidies are decreasing as well. Based on
our analysis, this policy should be questioned, if the aim is to foster labor supply and to
overcome labor market distortions from providing social insurance.
A Appendix: Risk-adjusted Slutsky equations
For deriving the risk-adjusted Slutsky equations (see also Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a), we
de¯ne the expenditure function X (t;s;R;V ) as the minimum level of non-labor income
T required to attain the expected indirect utility V . X (:) can be obtained by setting
X (t;s;R;V ) ´ T for the optimal level of indirect utility V as given in equation (14).
Consequently, the compensated demand functions are de¯ned as
c
c
i (t;s;R;V ) ´ ci (t;s;R;X (t;s;R;V )); (32)
where the superscript c denotes a compensated change. By totally di®erentiating the
compensated demand functions for a given V and using Shephard's lemma, we obtain






















































































B Appendix: Deriving Optimal Tax Rules
B.1 Optimal Income Taxation
From Roy's lemma, equation (18), and the Slutsky equations (see Appendix A), we ¯nd
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c1 , inserting the de¯nitions of the tax wedges
















E[©] and !e =
E[©ee]
E[©] are the expected shares of labor and education in
total earnings, respectively. De¯ning °e = R¢e
E[©] and °c1 =
R¢c1
E[©] as shares of expenditure on
education and ¯rst-period consumption in total earnings, respectively, allows us to de¯ne
"at = ¡(°e ¢ "et + °c1 ¢ "c1t) as the compensated elasticity of savings with respect to the
labor tax rate t. Setting s = ¿ = 0 leads to equation (26) in the text.
22B.2 Optimal Education Subsidies and Optimal Capital Taxa-
tion

















































De¯ning the expected-utility compensated elasticities with respect to the subsidy rate s
as "es = @ec
@s
1¡s
e , "ls = @lc
@s
1¡s





c1 , we ¯nd (after inserting the tax wedges
(21) to (23) and collecting terms)
s
1 ¡ s




The savings elasticity "as = ¡(°e ¢ "es + °c1 ¢ "c1s) < 0 combines the expenditure-share
weighted e®ects of education subsidies on educational investment and on ¯rst-period
consumption. Using the same techniques for optimal capital taxation, the ¯rst-order
condition (20) can be reformulated as















































By de¯ning the corresponding elasticities with respect to a change in the after-tax interest
rate R as "eR = @ec
@R
R
e , "lR = @lc
@R
R





c1, as well as taking the tax wedges (21)
to (23) into account, we end up with
¿r
R
¢ "aR = ¡t ¢ (!l ¢ "lR + ¼e ¢ !e ¢ "eR) +
s
1 ¡ s
¢ (1 ¡ ¼e) ¢ !e ¢ "eR: (42)
The savings elasticity is again de¯ned as "aR = ¡(°e ¢ "eR + °c1 ¢ "c1R) > 0. It is un-
ambiguously positive, because a higher net interest rate R renders both educational
investment and ¯rst-period consumption less attractive. Inserting equation (42) for ¿r
R
23into equation (39) and collecting terms, we arrive at equation (27) in the text.
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